China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy aims to integrate civilian economic, technological, and industrial resources with national defence development.1 Its institutional mechanism combines central-party-state coordination with military-industrial enterprises, universities, research institutes, and civilian firms.2 Governmental policy documents emphasise breaking institutional barriers between military and civilian sectors, and encouraging civilian technologies and enterprises to contribute to defence capabilities. 3 This institutional framework extends beyond conventional weapons production to strategic industries that provide critical inputs for military technologies.
Mineral extraction is one such domain. MCF becomes significant because strategically important mineral resources can be embedded within state-owned industrial groups, defence-related research networks, and downstream manufacturing systems. Rare earths provide the clearest example: the extraction and separation produce materials used in permanent magnets, sensors, motors, aerospace systems, and other technologies with defence applications.4 China has sought greater state coordination over the sector, as shown in its 2024 Rare Earth Management Regulation, according to which the government determines which enterprises can conduct mining and separation.5
The Bayan Obo-Baotou rare-earth complex, for example, illustrates the connection between mineral extraction from a commercial perspective and strategic industrial development in terms of national defence.6 Bayan Ob became the foundation of China’s major rare-earth production centre in Baotou alongside the construction of a state-owned heavy-industrial base. Research on this region shows that its development was closely connected to national strategic and defence-industrial priorities, while Baotou Steel became an important state-owned platform linking mineral extraction with processing and industrial production.7 The resulting mechanism integrates extraction, beneficiation, separation, and downstream materials, rather than treating rare earth as an isolated mining commodity.
This civil-military connection also extends beyond the mine. China Rare Earth Group, a centrally administered state-owned enterprise created through consolidation of major rare-earth assets, now spans mining, separation, deep processing, functional materials, and downstream applications.8 In 2024, the Group signed a strategic cooperation agreement and developed projects involving rare-earth permanent magnets with China Electronics Corporation (a major defence-electronics enterprise).9 China Electronics Technology Corporation’s Ninth Research Institute, meanwhile, develops rare-earth permanent magnet materials for aerospace and national-defence applications.10
The significance of China’s MCF in mineral extraction, therefore, lies in integration across the production chain. Extraction and processing provide the material base. State-owned industrial groups provide organisational capacity. Defence-linked enterprises provide downstream demand and technological applications. Minerals can thus become an upstream component of China’s broader defence-industrial system without requiring the extraction sector itself to be formally military-controlled.
1. State Council General Office of the People’s Republic of China, “国务院办公厅 关于推动国防科技工业军民融合深度发展的意见” [Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Promoting the Deep Development of Military-Civil Fusion in National Defense Science and Technology Industry], December 4, 2017, https://app.www.gov.cn/govdata/gov/201712/04/416117/article.html. ↩
2. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Council, and Central Military Commission, “关于经济建设和国防建设融合发展的意见” [Opinions on Integrating Economic and National Defense Development], July 21, 2016, https://www.sastind.gov.cn/n10086200/n10086319/c10244923/content.html. ↩
3. Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, “‘十三 五’科技军民融合发展专项规划” [“13th Five-Year” Special Plan for Science and Technology Military-Civil Fusion Development], 2017, translated by Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-13th-five-year-special-plan- for-st-military-civil-fusion-development/; Yoram Evron, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion and Military Procurement,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021), https://nbr.org/publication/chinas-military-civil-fusion-and-military-procurement/. ↩
4. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Ninth Research Institute, “稀土永磁材料及器件产品手册” [Rare-Earth Permanent-Magnet Materials and Components Product Handbook], accessed September 20, 2026, https://www.cetc.com.cn/9/338143/338148/1748215/index.html. ↩
5. State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “稀土管理条例” [Rare Earth Management Regulation], State Council Order No. 785, June 22, 2024, effective October 1, 2024, https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202406/conte nt_6960153.htm. ↩
6. Li Yi-ke et al., “Geology and Mineralization of the Bayan Obo Supergiant Carbonatite-Type REE-Nb-Fe Deposit in Inner Mongolia, China: A Review,” China Geology 6, no. 4 (2023): 716–750, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096519223015021. ↩
7. Julie Michelle Klinger, Rare Earth Frontiers: From Terrestrial Subsoils to Lunar Landscapes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstreams/4e731ffd-db5e-4778-932b-ca3d319e 1b04/download; 刘伟、方一兵、李道昭，“包头白云鄂博矿综合利用之中科院化工冶金研究回 顾” [Review of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Chemical Engineering and Metallurgy Research on the Comprehensive Utilisation of the Bayan Obo Mine], 《工程研究：跨学科视野中的工程》 [Engineering Research: Engineering in an Interdisciplinary Perspective] 11, no. 6 (2019): 576–586, https://doi.org/10.3724/SP.J.1224.2019.00576. ↩
8. State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, “国资委关于组建中国稀土集团有限公司的公告” [SASAC Announcement on the Establishment of China Rare Earth Group Co., Ltd.], December 23, 2021, https://wap.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/c22341074/content.html. ↩
9. “中国稀土集团与中国电子、华润集团、中国广核、比亚迪、华为等签署战略合作协议” [China Rare Earth Group Signs Strategic Cooperation Agreements with China Electronics, China Resources, China General Nuclear, BYD, Huawei, and Others], 证券时报网, May 17, 2024, https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1208323.html. ↩
10. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Ninth Research Institute, “稀土永磁材料及器件产品手册.”; State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, “军用技术转民用推广目录” [Catalogue of Military Technologies Promoted for Civilian Use], listing “高性 能稀土钴永磁材料的关键技术” [Key Technologies for High-Performance Rare-Earth Cobalt Permanent-Magnet Materials], https://www.sastind.gov.cn/n10086167/n10086216/c10404653/part/10404658.pdf. ↩
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