An Analysis of the Sahel

Since the Sahel bloc consisting of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso began in the last two years, we have seen a relatively smooth transition of the security sector from Western actors to Russian backed actors with the Chinese taking part as a primary economic hedge. However, the actual security situation has deteriorated dramatically in 2026.

The Russian backed actors are more of a continuation with the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin (founder of Wagner) in 2023 seeing Moscow move to regulate the private military sector. This has led to many actors being renamed within the network to become the Africa Corps, with Russia's Ministry of Defence managing the group under Lt. Gen. Andrey Averyanov.¹ The transition was done gradually with Mali hosting 1000 Africa Corps soldiers by December 2024. However, around 1500 Wagner soldiers remain in-country.¹This transition has continued with around another 1000 fighting added in June 2026.2 The Africa Corps now work alongside Mali’s national army (FAMa). Smaller numbers have been deployed to Niger and Burkina Faso, with around 100 and 300 personnel respectively.¹

The region has not improved however and the security situation has deteriorated most clearly in 2026. Mali is now one of the most dangerous areas for jihadists with around 40% of Burkina Faso not under the effective control of the state.² The year has been marked by a JNIM fuel blockade putting Bamako on a de-facto siege. In April JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (Tuareg led) launched the largest coordinated attack since 2012 on several locations including Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré and Mopti. This attack resulted in the murder of Mali’s defence minister Sadio Camara.^{2 3} Neither the Mali Army or Africa Corps expected such an attack.³ There is much debate about the casualties suffered with Mali claiming that over 200 members were killed. The Africa Corps claims that over 1000 insurgents were killed and Russia stating that over 300 were killed.³ This showed that the Russian backed actors were not replacing the Western actors one-for-one and JNIM and their rival Islamic State Sahel Province continue to grow in strength in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border zone.²

Although the Western withdrawal from the Sahel has happened, the effects are only becoming evident. France saw a major reduction as relationships with the juntas fell resulting in their closure or relocation of counter-terrorism bases. The most significant loss came from Niger with France pulling out after the 2023 coup. They lost their drone and surveillance capabilities.⁴ Similarly, the U.S. saw their military cooperation agreement ended in March 2024 with Niger’s junta resulting in them having to completely withdraw their counter-terrorism mission. They have also moved their remaining forces closer to Agadez.⁵ However, this withdrawal has not been as complete. The U.S. still has around a thousand troops in Niger and have restarted drone flying and counter-terrorism activities. The Trump administration has also started to engage with Alliance of Sahel States governments.⁶ However, much of the ISR capabilities have been moved to Nigeria. Around 200 personnel and numerous MQ-9 Reaper drones have been deployed to help with Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP. A senior AFRICOM official noted that they are not looking to replace the drone base in Niger.⁷ This results in a more complete withdrawal of surveillance capabilities with them now being focused on neighbouring countries.

China has not taken any obvious role in the security situation. They have invested in the mining sector with their state-owned Ganfeng opening a lithium mine in Southern Mali in December 2024. However, the juntas have moved away from Western companies to give mining rights to Russian, Chinese and Turkish interests. Niger has removed France’s Orano from their uranium mines and Burkina Faso has nationalised British gold mines.⁸ Analysts note that this has given Sahel Governments more confidence to cut their reliance on Europe as they now have more choices.⁹ China have a strong position in Niger with Zijin Mining having a stake in gold and uranium. This is due to the trend of increased resource nationalism in the region with Canadian, British and French companies losing their licences.^{9 10} China are therefore acting as an investor and infrastructure partner, working with Governments that the West have largely distanced themselves from.

Overall, the Sahel bloc has not seen a stable tripartite division within the region. The Russian backed actors are now more present than ever since the transition to the Africa Corps but the April attack and fuel blockade in Bamako has shown they have failed to provide security to the juntas. The U.S. withdrawal has also not been as complete with activity in Niger continuing. Finally, China are increasing their economic influence in the region but the security situation surrounding these resources has increased in danger (as seen with the Morila gold mine in Mali being attacked in January 2026. Workers were taken hostage but released).¹¹ Overall, the security situation has changed but the region is now volatile with all external actors working in a Sahel that is more volatile than they intended.

Notes & References

Notes