Korea is exposed to the U.S.-China contest on both sides at once, and through the same assets. The two firms that anchor the U.S. memory-chip alliance run their China fabs under American licenses that now expire every year. In the first year of that regime, Korea sold China more chips than ever and turned a three-year trade deficit with Beijing into a surplus. The state program meant to give Korea its own AI trains on American GPUs and has disqualified its first casualty for carrying frozen weights from a Chinese model. Same firms, same chips, same year.
That makes Korea’s case different from Taiwan’s. Taiwan’s exposure is a chokepoint, one asset the world cannot replace: as of 2021 the island held 92 percent of the world’s capacity to make chips below 10 nanometers.1 Korea holds nothing of that kind. Its memory can be made elsewhere. What Korea has instead is simultaneity, and Seoul’s president has said that the old formula, security with Washington and economy with Beijing, no longer works.2 This entry shows what has replaced it.
Washington did not close Korea’s China fabs. It put them on a one-year clock. Samsung took $4.745 billion in CHIPS Act funding for its Texas fabs, and SK hynix took $458 million for an Indiana packaging plant.3 Each award carries a ten-year bar on any “material expansion” of chipmaking capacity in China.4
In 2025 the terms tightened. On September 2, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) struck three China fabs from the Validated End-User list, effective December 31, 2025: Samsung’s Xi’an plant, SK hynix’s Wuxi plant, and the Dalian plant SK hynix bought from Intel, still listed under Intel’s name.5 BIS would license the fabs to keep running but “does not intend to grant licenses to expand capacity or upgrade technology at fabs in China.”6 On December 30, Reuters reported, Washington granted both firms licenses for calendar 2026.7 Those licenses expire on December 31, 2026.8 As of September 2026, no renewal has been reported. Reuters reported that SK Hynix was seeking approval to ship more equipment to Dalian while weighing a new plant in the United States.9
The firms have not pulled back. Both raised capital spending at their China fabs in 2025, Samsung’s Xi’an by 67.5 percent and SK hynix’s Wuxi by 102 percent.10
The alliance also carries a price. Seoul pledged $350 billion in U.S. investment, and Washington set its reciprocal tariff on Korean goods at 15 percent.11 On chips, Washington promised terms “no less favorable” than those in any future agreement covering “a volume of semiconductor trade at least as large as Korea’s,”12 a formula Seoul reads as Taiwan parity.13 The rate did not hold. The 15 percent rate rested on tariffs the President had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).14 On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act does not authorize tariffs at all.15 Korea’s negotiated rate disappeared with those tariffs. The administration replaced the voided tariffs with a flat 10 percent surcharge on every trading partner, with no country-specific caps, which ran from February 24 to July 24.16 When that surcharge expired, a new Section 301 duty took its place; for Korea it is set at 12.5 percent, net of the most-favored-nation rate.17 In March, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had also opened two sets of Section 301 investigations that name Korea, one on excess industrial capacity and one on forced labor.18 The second produced the July duty.
Semiconductors sit on a separate track. A 25 percent tariff on chips took effect on January 15, 2026, but it reaches only a narrow class of advanced logic chips, not the memory Korea exports, and it defers “broader tariffs” the Commerce Secretary recommended to a second phase after negotiations.19 The chip clause in the November deal is Seoul’s insurance against that later round.
Chip 4, the four-way coordination among the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea whose working group first met in September 2022, held one senior-officials meeting in February 2023; no later meeting has been publicly reported.20
Korea’s AI ambitions run on the same two exposures. In September 2025 President Lee launched a National AI Strategy Committee with the goal of making Korea “one of the world’s top three AI powers.”21 The centerpiece is a state-backed program to build sovereign foundation models; five consortia were selected in August 2025.22 The compute comes from the United States. Nvidia announced in October 2025 that Korea would receive more than a quarter-million of its GPUs, up to 50,000 of them through the science ministry for sovereign AI development.23
Inputs are policed too. In January 2026 the ministry dropped Naver Cloud from the program because its models used encoders taken from an external open model with the weights left frozen.24 The encoders came from Alibaba’s Qwen.25 Naver said in April that it would replace the vision encoder with its own.26 A Korean sovereign model, then, trains on American chips and may not carry another model’s weights. The weights that disqualified the first casualty were Chinese.
The rulebook followed. The AI Basic Act took effect on January 22, 2026. It imposes labeling duties on generative AI and a domestic-representative requirement on large foreign providers, and it leaves national defense and security uses outside its scope.27
Korea also keeps a seat in norm-setting, and in 2025 and 2026 Seoul used that seat on two fronts. On the civil side, Seoul signed the Paris summit statement on inclusive AI in February 2025, which Washington and London declined;28 President Lee presided over a Security Council debate on AI in September;29 and as APEC host Seoul wrote an AI initiative into the Gyeongju leaders’ declaration in November.30 On the military side Korea co-founded the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit with the Netherlands in 2023 and hosted the second summit in Seoul in September 2024.31 In 2025, Korea ran five regional consultations to carry the process forward,32 and with the Netherlands it sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution on military AI adopted that December by 167 votes to 5, the United States among the five.33 In June 2026 Korea and the Netherlands gave the opening remarks at the Geneva consultations the resolution mandated; the United States did not attend, and Korea’s ambassador proposed follow-up steps for the General Assembly to take up later in 2026.34
That work runs apart from the industrial program, and the separation is built in. The AI Basic Act exempts systems built for national defense or security.35 Military AI sits with the defense ministry, which opened a Defense AI Center in 2025;36 the model program and the GPU allocation sit with the science ministry.37 And the two tracks point in different directions. In the same autumn that Korea sponsored a resolution Washington voted against, it agreed to take a quarter-million American GPUs,38 and a bilateral deal signed that October refocused its AI Safety Institute’s partnership with its American counterpart “on metrology and standards innovation.”39 On the rules for military AI, Korea and the Netherlands moved ahead without the United States. On the chips that train Korea’s own models, Korea cannot move without the United States.
In the same year Washington put the fabs on a clock, Korea sold China more chips than ever.
Start with the baseline. Korea exported $709.7 billion in 2025; semiconductors accounted for $173.4 billion of it. China took $130.8 billion and the United States $122.9 billion.40 China remained the largest market, but the gap had narrowed to under $8 billion.
Then 2026 broke the pattern. By September 5, exports had already passed the whole of 2025. Semiconductors made up $281.2 billion of the January-to-August total, 40.6 percent of everything Korea shipped.41 Exports to China reached $145.3 billion, up 76.1 percent, more than in all of 2025.42 The bilateral balance turned with them. In 2023, Korea ran its first annual trade deficit with China since ties began in 1992, $18.0 billion, and stayed in deficit through 2025.43 In the first five months of 2026 it posted a $9.9 billion surplus, on Chinese demand for AI memory.44
The two firms show the same exposure from opposite sides. Samsung’s China revenue reached ₩88.6 trillion in the first half of 2026, up 207.7 percent, against ₩70.6 trillion from the Americas.45 SK hynix’s mix ran the other way: 64.1 percent of first-half revenue came from the United States and 24.6 percent from China.46 One firm now leans toward buyers in China and the other toward buyers in the United States. Both run their China fabs under the same annual license.
Politics followed trade. Xi Jinping met Lee Jae Myung in Gyeongju in November 2025, his first visit to Korea in eleven years, and Lee went to Beijing in January 2026.47 The Beijing summit produced fourteen memoranda and a pledge of “meaningful progress within the year” on the services and investment chapters of the bilateral free trade agreement. Beijing also promised a general-license channel for Korean firms buying critical minerals.48 The sixteenth negotiating round met in Beijing from August 31 to September 4.49
Beijing has also shown what it can withhold. On October 14, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce sanctioned five U.S. subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean for assisting a U.S. trade action against Chinese shipbuilding; on November 10 it suspended the sanctions for one year.50 Three days earlier it had suspended its October rare-earth export controls, until November 10, 2026.51 Korea sourced 95 percent of its rare-earth metal imports from China in 2023.52 Reach, then release, on Beijing’s calendar.
Lee has said the old formula is gone. “It is true that Korea has pursued a position of security with the US and economy with China in the past,” he told an audience in Washington in August 2025. “But we are no longer in a situation where such an attitude is possible.”53
As in Vietnam’s case, Korea is exposed to Washington and Beijing at the same time. But as in Taiwan’s case, Korea’s exposure to both runs through semiconductors. That combination is what sets Korea apart.
Taiwan’s exposure runs through one asset. The island’s share of advanced capacity54 comes with a customer base on one side: 70 percent of TSMC’s net revenue in 2024 came from North America.55 Korea has no comparable concentration. In the first half of 2026 Samsung booked more revenue in China than in the Americas, and SK hynix booked nearly two-thirds of its revenue in the United States.
Vietnam is exposed on both sides at once, but through different assets. Hanoi raised its U.S. relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 202356 while buying 38 percent of its imports from China in 2024.57 Semiconductors play little part in either tie. Vietnam’s chip role is assembly, test, and packaging, about 1 percent of global capacity in that segment in 2022, and its first wafer fab, approved in 2025, is targeted for completion before 2030.58
Korea’s two exposures run through the same assets. The fabs that Washington licenses sit inside the market that now buys more Korean chips than any other. The GPUs that Washington sells are the compute behind a model program that dropped a team for carrying Chinese weights. Vietnam hedges with diplomacy on one side and trade on the other. Korea cannot separate the sides, because the same chip, the same fab, and the same program face both.
In the running order of Region I, Korea belongs between Taiwan and Vietnam. Taiwan is the case of one country holding an asset the world cannot replace. Vietnam is the case of one country exposed to both powers through different channels: diplomacy toward Washington and trade with Beijing. Korea has Vietnam’s double exposure and Taiwan’s semiconductor channel, but has none of Vietnam’s room to keep the two apart.
Korea is not being asked to choose between Washington and Beijing. Korea is being asked to meet dates. Beijing’s suspensions of the rare-earth export controls and of the Hanwha Ocean sanctions lapse on November 10, 2026. The American licenses for the two firms’ China fabs expire on December 31, 2026, and as of this writing no renewal for 2027 has been announced. Beyond that, Seoul must fund the next installment of the $350 billion pledge, with Washington already asking for more, and the teams left in the sovereign-model program must pass the next evaluation without borrowed weights. None of these is a choice. Each is a permission that one side can grant or withhold, and each comes due on its own date. The question for Seoul in 2027 is not which side to choose. The question is how long one country can keep renewing permissions from both sides through the same firms, the same fabs, and the same program, and what each renewal will cost.
1. Antonio Varas, Raj Varadarajan, Jimmy Goodrich, and Falan Yinug, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era (Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, April 2021), https://www.semiconductors.org/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chain-in-an-uncertain-era/; on chokepoints, Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00351. ↩
2. Jae-young Han, “S.Korea’s Lee Signals End to ‘Security with US, Economy with China’ Policy; to Hike Defense Costs,” KED Global, August 26, 2025, https://www.kedglobal.com/business-politics/newsView/ked202508260007. Lee spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., August 25, 2025. ↩
3. U.S. Department of Commerce, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Award with Samsung Electronics,” press release, December 20, 2024, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/12/biden-harris-administration-announces-chips-incenti ves-award-samsung; U.S. Department of Commerce, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Award with SK hynix,” press release, December 19, 2024, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/12/biden-harris-administration-announces-chips-incenti ves-award-sk-hynix. ↩
4. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Preventing the Improper Use of CHIPS Act Funding,” final rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 65600 (September 25, 2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/09/25/2023-20471/preventing-the-improper-use-of-chips-act -funding. ↩
5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Revocation of Validated End-User Authorizations in the People's Republic of China,” final rule, 90 Fed. Reg. 42321 (September 2, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/02/2025-16735/revocation-of-validated-end-user-authoriz ations-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china. The rule names Samsung China Semiconductor Co., Ltd., SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd., and Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) Ltd. ↩
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Department of Commerce Closes Export Controls Loophole for Foreign-Owned Semiconductor Fabs in China,” press release, August 29, 2025, https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-closes-export-controls-loophole-foreign-owned-sem iconductor-fabs-china. ↩
7. Hyunjoo Jin, “US Approves Samsung, SK Hynix Chipmaking Tool Shipments to China for 2026,” Reuters, December 30, 2025, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/samsung-wins-us-annual-approval-041415683.html. ↩
8. Jin, “US Approves Samsung, SK Hynix Chipmaking Tool Shipments”; “Samsung Shipped $12.7B More Chips to China Than US in H1,” TechTimes, August 15, 2026, https://www.techtimes.com/articles/324568/20260815/samsung-shipped-127b-more-chips-china-us-h1-xi-fab- annual-us-license-deadline-looms.htm. ↩
9. Karen Freifeld and Hyunjoo Jin, “Exclusive: SK Hynix Conditions New US Factory on More US Chip Equipment Exports to China, Sources Say,” Reuters, October 14, 2026, https://wtaq.com/2026/10/14/exclusive-sk-hynix-conditions-new-us-factory-on-more-us-chip-equipment-expo rts-to-china-sources-say/. ↩
10. Lee Yeon-woo, “Korean Chip Giants Step Up China Investments to Combat AI Memory Shortage,” Korea Times, March 30, 2026, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20260330/korean-chip-giants-step-up-china-investments-to -combat-ai-memory-shortage. ↩
11. White House, “Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung,” November 13, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/joint-fact-sheet-on-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-with- president-lee-jae-myung; Tom Ramage, “U.S., South Korea Move to Lock In Lower Tariff Rate with $350 Billion Deal,” Korea Economic Institute of America, October 29, 2025, https://keia.org/analysis/u-s-south-korea-move-to-lock-in-lower-tariff-rate-with-350-billion-deal/. ↩
12. White House, “Joint Fact Sheet.” ↩
13. “한미 오찬 정상회담 관련 김용범 정책실장 브리핑” [Briefing by Presidential Chief of Staff for Policy Kim Yong-beom on the Korea-U.S. Summit Luncheon], Office of the President, via korea.kr, October 29, 2025, https://www.korea.kr/briefing/presidentView.do?newsId=148953426. Korean-language source; not independently verified in English. The briefing states that semiconductors will receive tariff treatment “not disadvantageous compared with Taiwan, our main competitor” (author’s translation). ↩
14. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287 (U.S. February 20, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_4gcj.pdf; White & Case, “Trump Administration Imposes 10% Section 122 Tariff, Plans to Replace IEEPA Tariffs,” February 2026, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/trump-administration-imposes-10-section-122-tariff-plan-replace-iee pa-tariffs. ↩
15. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287. ↩
16. Proclamation 11012, “Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems,” February 20, 2026, 91 Fed. Reg. 9339 (February 25, 2026), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/25/2026-03824/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-t o-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems; White & Case, “Trump Administration Imposes 10% Section 122 Tariff.” ↩
17. Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR Takes Action in Forced Labor Section 301 Investigations,” press release, July 23, 2026, https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/july/ustr-takes-action-forced-labor-sectio n-301-investigations. ↩
18. Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production,” press release, March 11, 2026, https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-section-301-investig ations-relating-structural-excess-capacity-and-production; Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR Initiates 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Forced Labor,” press release, March 12, 2026, https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-60-section-301-inves tigations-relating-failures-take-action-forced-labor. ↩
19. Proclamation 11002, “Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products,” January 14, 2026, 91 Fed. Reg. 2443 (January 20, 2026), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/20/2026-01052/adjusting-imports-of-semiconductors-sem iconductor-manufacturing-equipment-and-their-derivative. ↩
20. “Tech War: Taiwan Says US-Led Chip 4 Alliance Held First Senior Officials Meeting,” Reuters, via South China Morning Post, February 25, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3211594/tech-war-taiwan-says-us-led-chip-4-alliance-held-first-s enior-officials-meeting. ↩
21. “Newly Launched Committee Seeks to Make Korea Top 3 AI Power,” Korea.net (Korean Culture and Information Service), September 9, 2025, https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=278629. ↩
22. 조이환 [Jo Yi-hwan], “[국가대표 AI] 독자 AI 정예팀 5곳 확정…'K-AI' 주권 경쟁 본격화” [Five Elite Teams Confirmed for Sovereign AI; “K-AI” Sovereignty Race Begins], ZDNet Korea, August 4, 2025, https://zdnet.co.kr/view/?no=20250804120134. Korean-language source; reports the Ministry of Science and ICT announcement of the same day. ↩
23. NVIDIA, “NVIDIA, South Korea Government and Industrial Giants Build AI Infrastructure,” press release, October 30, 2025, https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/south-korea-ai-infrastructure. ↩
24. Byungho Kim, “LG AI Tops Korea’s Sovereign AI Project as Naver Cloud Fails to Advance, MSIT Confirms,” Inven Global, January 15, 2026, https://www.invenglobal.com/articles/20098/lg-ai-tops-koreas-sovereign-a i-project-as-naver-cloud-fails-to-advance-msit-confirms; Ministry of Science and ICT, “독자 AI 파운데이션 모델 프로젝트 1차 단계 평가 결과” [Results of the First-Stage Evaluation of the Sovereign AI Foundation Model Project], press briefing, via korea.kr, January 15, 2026, https://www.korea.kr/briefing/policyBriefingView.do?newsId=156740468. Korean-language source. The ministry stated that a model using an external encoder with its weights “frozen” rather than updated could not be recognized as an independent foundation model (author's translation). ↩
25. Lee Gyu-lee, “Fairness Dispute Clouds National AI Foundation Model Project,” Korea Times, January 14, 2026, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/tech-science/20260114/fairness-dispute-clouds-national-ai-foundation- model-project. ↩
26. “네이버, AI 모델서 중국산 뺀다…‘자체 비전 인코더’ 전면 적용” [Naver Removes Chinese Components from AI Model, Applies Its Own Vision Encoder Across the Board], 뉴스1 [News1], April 17, 2026, https://www.news1.kr/it-science/general-it/6139651. Korean-language source; not independently verified in English. ↩
27. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “South Korea AI Basic Act,” Market Intelligence, May 29, 2026, https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/south-korea-ai-basic-act; Sunha Bae and So Jeong Kim, “AI Security Strategy and South Korea's Challenges,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 20, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-security-strategy-and-south-koreas-challenges. ↩
28. “Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet,” Paris AI Action Summit, February 11, 2025, text and list of signatories as published by the Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/02/11/statement-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligen ce-people-and. The Republic of Korea is listed among the signatories; the United States and the United Kingdom are not. ↩
29. UN Security Council, 10005th meeting, “Artificial Intelligence and International Peace and Security,” September 24, 2025, S/PV.10005, presided over by Lee Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea, video record at https://media.un.org/avlibrary/en/asset/d346/d3460317; concept note S/2025/593 (September 22, 2025); see also Security Council Report, “High-Level Open Debate on Artificial Intelligence,” What’s In Blue, September 24, 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/high-level-open-debate-on-artificial-intelligence.p hp. ↩
30. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, “2025 APEC Leaders’ Gyeongju Declaration,” November 1, 2025, para. 15, https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2025/2025-apec-leaders--gyeongju-declaration, and Annex, “APEC Artificial Intelligence (AI) Initiative (2026–2030),” https://mddb.apec.org/Documents/2025/AELM/AELM/25_aelm_dec_1.pdf. ↩
31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), “REAIM 2023 Call to Action,” February 16, 2023, https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2023/02/16/reaim-2023-call-to-action; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea), “Outcome of REAIM Summit 2024,” September 10, 2024, https://tls.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321057. ↩
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea), press release on Deputy Minister Jeong Yeon-doo’s attendance at REAIM 2026, February 6, 2026, as reprinted in “South Korea’s Director-General Jeong Yeon-doo Attends REAIM 2026 High-Level Summit,” The World Korea, February 6, 2026, https://www.twk.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1605. The release lists regional consultations held in 2025 in Seoul, Geneva, Islamabad, Nairobi, and New York. Korean original: “정연두 외교전략정보본부장, REAIM 2026 참석,” via korea.kr, https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156743437 (Korean-language source). ↩
33. UN General Assembly, Resolution 80/58, “Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” A/RES/80/58, adopted December 1, 2025, by 167 votes to 5 (Burundi, Israel, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United States), with 5 abstentions, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/80/58; sponsorship and vote as recorded in Laura Bruun, Jules Palayer, and Vincent Boulanin, “Artificial Intelligence and International Peace and Security,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2026 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026), chap. 14, 447, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB26%2014%20AI%20Governance.pdf. ↩
34. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Informal Exchanges on Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” agenda, Geneva, June 15–17, 2026, https://unodaweb-meetings.unoda.org/public/2026-05/AIMD%20Informal%20Exchanges%20Agenda%20-% 20FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEASE.pdf; Michael T. Klare, “UN Members Discuss AI in the Military Domain,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2026, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-07/news/un-members-discuss-ai-military-domain. ↩
35. Rachel Shivhare and Sungbum Park, “South Korea’s New AI Framework Act: A Balancing Act between Innovation and Regulation,” Future of Privacy Forum, April 18, 2025, https://fpf.org/blog/south-koreas-new-ai-framework-act-a-balancing-act-between-innovation-and-regulation/, on Article 4(2); Sunha Bae and So Jeong Kim, “AI Security Strategy and South Korea’s Challenges,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 20, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-security-strategy-and-south-koreas-challenges. ↩
36. “South Korea Accelerates AI Push in Next-Generation Weapons Programs,” Korea Herald, October 27, 2025, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10602299. ↩
37. Jo, “독자 AI 정예팀 5곳 확정” [Five Elite Teams Confirmed for Sovereign AI], Korean-language source (see note 22); NVIDIA, “NVIDIA, South Korea Government and Industrial Giants Build AI Infrastructure.” ↩
38. UN General Assembly, Resolution 80/58; NVIDIA, “NVIDIA, South Korea Government and Industrial Giants Build AI Infrastructure.” ↩
39. White House, “The United States Signs Technology Prosperity Deals with Japan and Korea,” October 29, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2025/10/the-united-states-signs-technology-prosperity-deals-with-japan- and-korea/. ↩
40. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (formerly Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy), “Korea’s Annual Exports Reach New Highs in 2025,” press release, January 2, 2026, https://english.motir.go.kr/eng/article/EATCLdfa319ada/2470/view. Figures are provisional. ↩
41. “Korea’s Exports Top $700 Billion, Surpassing All of Last Year,” Seoul Economic Daily, September 5, 2026, https://en.sedaily.com/finance/2026/09/05/koreas-exports-top-700-billion-surpassing-all-of-last-year. The comparison uses the Korea Customs Service’s revised 2025 total of $709.3 billion; the trade ministry’s provisional figure cited above is $709.7 billion. ↩
42. “Korea’s Exports Top $700 Billion”; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, “Korea’s Annual Exports Reach New Highs in 2025.” ↩
43. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, “2023년 중국 대외무역의 특징과 한·중 무역에 대한 시사점” [Features of China’s Foreign Trade in 2023 and Implications for Korea-China Trade], 오늘의 세계경제 [World Economy Today] 24, no. 3 (March 14, 2024), https://www.kiep.go.kr/galleryDownload.es?bid=0003&list_no=11202&seq=1, Korean-language source, for the 2023 deficit of $18.0 billion; 김동현 [Kim Dong-hyun], “한중 무역지형 변할까…대중 무역수지 4년만에 흑자 유력” [Trade Balance with China Likely to Turn to Surplus for the First Time in Four Years], 뉴시스 [Newsis], June 15, 2026, https://www.newsis.com/view/NISX20260615_0003668880, Korean-language source, for the 2024 and 2025 deficits and for the characterization of 2023 as the first annual deficit since diplomatic relations began in 1992. ↩
44. “China’s AI Chip Demand Pushes Korea into Rare Surplus with Top Trade Partner,” Korea Times, June 4, 2026, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/economy/20260604/chinas-ai-chip-demand-pus hes-korea-into-rare-surplus-with-top-trade-partner; Kim, “대중 무역수지 4년만에 흑자 유력” [Trade Balance with China Likely to Turn to Surplus], Korean-language source (see note 43). ↩
45. Samsung Electronics, 2026 Half Interim Report (report for the six months ended June 30, 2026), August 14, 2026, 23, https://images.samsung.com/is/content/samsung/assets/global/ir/docs/2026_Half_Interim_Report.pdf. Regional revenue is on a separate (parent-only) basis. The year-on-year increase is from “Samsung Shipped $12.7B More Chips to China Than US in H1,” TechTimes. ↩
46. SK hynix, 반기보고서 (2026.06) [Half-Year Report, June 2026], filed with the Financial Supervisory Service’s DART system, August 14, 2026, report no. 20260814003509, as reported in 곽우진 [Kwak Woo-jin], “SK하이닉스, 상반기 엔비디아 매출 17조…미국 비중 64%” [SK hynix: First-Half Nvidia Revenue \17 Trillion, U.S. Share 64%], KBS News, August 14, 2026, https://v.daum.net/v/20260814180213173. Korean-language source; not independently verified in English. ↩
47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with ROK President Lee Jae Myung,” November 1, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202511/t20251101_11745458.html, and January 5, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202601/t20260105_11806810.html. ↩
48. Office of the President (Republic of Korea), “한중 정상회담 관련 위성락 국가안보실장 브리핑” [Briefing by National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac on the Korea-China Summit], January 5, 2026, https://www.president.go.kr/briefings/mq7evBz8. Korean-language source; the summit outcomes are also reported in “Lee, Xi Hold Beijing Summit as Lee Calls 2026 ‘Turning Point’ in Bilateral Ties,” Korea Times, January 5, 2026, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20260105/lee-xi-hold-beijing-summit-as-lee-calls-2026-turning-p oint-in-bilateral-ties. The Chinese readout counts fifteen cooperation documents, the Korean briefing fourteen memoranda plus one instrument of cultural-property donation. ↩
49. 김성서 [Kim Seong-seo], “베이징서 한·중 FTA 서비스·투자 16차 협상…금융·시장개방 속도” [16th Round of Korea-China FTA Services and Investment Talks in Beijing; Pace Picks Up on Finance and Market Opening], 아주경제 [Aju Business Daily], August 31, 2026, https://www.ajunews.com/view/20260830173718273. Korean-language source; not independently verified in English. ↩
50. Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 6 of 2025, October 14, 2025, https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_001308ff9a6a474a997c644961c9b997.html, and Order No. 7 of 2025, November 10, 2025, https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_6c39182947834183b260fe287d2c0792.html (in Chinese); “Update: China Announces Countermeasures against Five U.S.-Linked Subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean,” Xinhua, October 14, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251014/1b25233dd6fc44d6bdfe870364330d58/c.html; “China Suspends Sanctions on Hanwha Ocean as Beijing-Washington Trade Truce Takes Hold,” KED Global, November 10, 2025, https://www.kedglobal.com/business-politics/newsView/ked202511100008. ↩
51. Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China, Announcement No. 70 of 2025, November 7, 2025, https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_b1ec77dd3f0d4762952904df7cdaadec.html (in Chinese); Jones Day, “BIS Suspends Affiliates Rule, China Pauses Rare Earth Export Controls,” November 2025, https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2025/11/bis-suspends-affiliates-rule_china-pauses-rare-earth-export-co ntrols. ↩
52. “Korea in Tight Spot as China Tightens Rare Earth Export Controls ahead of APEC Summit,” Korea JoongAng Daily, October 2025, https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/business/korea-in-tight-spot-as-china-tightens-rare-earth-export-control s-ahead-of-apec-summit/11801824. The reported share is 95.1 percent. ↩
53. Han, “S.Korea’s Lee Signals End to ‘Security with US, Economy with China’ Policy.” ↩
54. Varas et al., Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain. ↩
55. Pamela Kennedy, “Why Taiwan Fears ‘America First’ Risks Eroding Its ‘Silicon Shield,’” Stimson Center, October 10, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/why-taiwan-fears-america-first-risks-eroding-its-silicon-shield/. ↩
56. White House, “Fact Sheet: President Joseph R. Biden and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong Announce the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” September 10, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-josep h-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partne rship/. ↩
57. “Viet Nam’s Foreign Trade Hits Record High in 2024,” Government of Viet Nam, Online Newspaper of the Government, January 7, 2025, https://en.baochinhphu.vn/viet-nams-foreign-trade-hits-record-high-in-2024-111250107090624952.htm. Author’s calculation from General Department of Customs data: US$144.3 billion of US$380.76 billion in total imports. ↩
58. SEMI Southeast Asia, “Vietnam’s Semiconductor Pivot: From ATP Workhorse to Front-End Contender,” August 28, 2025, https://www.semi.org/sea/blogs/Vietnams-Semiconductor-Pivot. ↩
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