Strings Attached: Measuring Leverage in the Globalized World Order

Power, as written in the Peace of Westphalia, must be balanced with legitimacy.¹ It is the institutions that are established by great powers that allow them the assurance of their power rather than creating constant challengers. Where one force rises, another shall arise to meet it- but this is mitigated greatly by a liberal world order of institutions; if everyone plays by the same rules, competition becomes friendly rather than inflammatory. Wars fall out of fashion, peacetime extends beyond an absence of war and into a time of prosperity, globalized trade, knowledge, and innovation. This is how geopolitics has been perceived throughout recent history for some time now. Although it has its variants- particularly in the deterministic departments, wherein concerns of geography, governmental structure, religious influence, and so forth hold prominence, or with extensions of an increasingly liberalized system as Modelski theorized²- the skeleton of geopolitics has largely remained. It has been broken down, with an analysis of individuals, systems, and worldwide involvement, echelons of power, the causes of civil war, and the remedy to economic windfalls, and so forth. This discourse, however, believes there is a more simplistic explanation to geopolitics. Simplistic, it is imperative to note, does not mean with less complexity, rather with more comprehensibility. This paper argues instead that geopolitics, the flow of great powers, and the development of the world as we know it arose from a different mapping of power. It is not solely economic, nor military, nor geographical, nor institutional, nor is it philosophical, religious, sociological, or psychological; this paper argues instead that, like early theories of quantum mechanics, the world is constructed of several strings, tethering, pulling, and influencing powers throughout the world. This paper argues for an interdependence of all nations, even in a time before the nations were interconnected. In Part I, this discourse will explore the facets of strings, their applications, and their quantification; Part II will elaborate upon the types of strings and their respective uses, concluding with an analysis of how strings serve the role of modern colonies and thus feed what can be considered modern empires.

The Concert of Europe served as a unique era of peace through interconnection; if everyone was allied, no one would wage war. The same logic proliferated the entire world following WWII and the fall of the USSR- the world would, through globalization, assimilate into democratic, liberal nations. If everyone was intertwined economically, no one would have reason to wage war- they would merely trade for that which they desired. China, to the disappointment of Western geopolitical scholars and great concern of Western world leaders, did not follow this path. Instead, it extracted value from the WTO after its ascension in 2001,³ and bolstered its own economy and prominence in the world, ingraining itself, while remaining a domestically command-economy, authoritarian state. As such, the international “concert of the world” never occurred; however, that is not to say there is not still music playing. Although it is a song only plucked by certain powers, applying tension to others, a tune still rises from the international concert, one played on strings.

What are Strings? The Ties That Bind. Power is the ability to exercise one's will upon others, by any means necessary. Power is not, however, influence. Strings are the connections of power; the tethers that mark relationships, dependencies, alliances, and opposition. Legitimacy has been viewed as a support for power; therefore, to be a superpower requires each to be wielded equally- the arrow and olive branch. However, legitimacy is simply the perception of others, while power is simply the ability to impose will upon others. Therefore, although the combination is effective at explaining the balance a state must keep to become powerful, it lacks the dynamism of interconnectivity. A nation that is tethered to a highly credible nation, for example, gains legitimacy by association; power is shared in a globalized world. The fabric of reality, as it were, is strung together by strings of relationships. It is these strings that forge the bonds of power and legitimacy alike.

The ties between individuals, groups, and world powers fluctuate in degrees of significance, in degrees of strength. However, when a string is pulled in one direction, those tethered to it follow. It is this notion that explains the role of treaties and organizations throughout history on both a micro and macro spectrum. A powerful individual pulls at the heartstrings of their followers, calling them to act, to follow, where the leader, holding the leash, goes. Individuals in this sense hold significant power over a larger group- it is the influence of a charismatic leader that gains support from political parties- from the people, be it in a cult, an organization, or a nation. These strings are some of the most powerful in a nation- the word of a trusted president, the critical claims made by leading figures of thought, the mouthpiece of the press expressing concern- tend to shift the dynamic of nations; opinion polls sway based on the words of the president. This is not to say leaders have absolute power; rather, their role of power does represent their ability to pull strings- which will be later explored- effectively. Tracing the line down the echelons, the strings become more tangled; although the pattern is that of clear cohesion directed up, there are minor allegiances, factions, friendships, rivalries, and healthy competitions within the ranks. A boss may envy the efficiency of an underling, an employee may act against the interests of their boss- and thereby the company. Orders all come from the top, but their process throughout the chain of command, how they are followed and why, is the result of minor strings tangled amongst one another. Human interactions can, as a whole, reflect this- a friend may pursue a new hobby, find it enjoyable, and result in a wider trend of pursuing that activity. This is a subtle influence- soft power as it is known geopolitically. The expansion of this is that some will find the activity too mainstream, distasteful, or otherwise not their style. They will, in turn, form a counterclique. Nonetheless, the tangles of influence, power dynamics, and friendship quickly interfere with one another. This is true in any organization, where leaders find constant drama, conflict, and unusual relationships of causal chains tracing back through innumerable employees and their strings. Governmentally, this is utilized to a similar extent- the United States' government functions as a deliberate slowing and tangling of power, rather than a singular ruler. Without monarchy, there is a sluggish contest of tug-of-war constantly played throughout the democracy; the people tug here, the government there, the businesses elsewhere. It is through this entanglement that political processes are slowed; checks and balances deliberately pull weight in one direction or another, ensuring there is no one line of power to be plucked by a greedy ruler. The entanglement of people, and an array of individuals in varying degrees of power, compounded with the natural propensity of people to become envious, wrathful, followers or foes, the system of a democratic republic serves its role of halting any autocratic schemes. It is this same system of string-pulling that famously slows the deliberation of the European Union; NATO suffers this problem to a lesser extent- it is designed as a military pact, and so it requires a commander rather than a council,⁴ for the very same reason military chain of command is imperative. Too many generals spoil the battle. NATO thus functions under more executive command; therefore, when action is needed, it is not hindered. On a world scale, the entanglement becomes more complex. The strings between people in corporations are clean enough- it is much neater in the military chain of command, but still present; however, geopolitically the ties that bind are economic, militant, domestic, as well as individual. Every level of this tangle is present in geopolitics, thus creating a deeply interconnected, complex system of dependencies, alliances and oppositions. Each is unique; each is entangled with others- to pull on Ireland's economy in turn is to pull on secondary and tertiary unexpected outcomes. That is not to say that a geopolitical leader or strategist must focus on these outcomes in their degrees- often it is blunt, direct actions that serve their initial purpose with marginal tertiary impact. That said, by deliberately acting and targeting these second and third-degree elements, leaders are able to subtly move and indirectly manipulate their allies or opponents. Indirect action is fundamental for any kind of warfare, be it the wheeler-dealers in politics, the multi-step strategies of physical conflicts, the traps set in chess, or economic pursuits pulled through infrastructure into alignment. Although China has mastered the two-step play, a bait-and-switch strategy, wherein the victim states take infrastructure deals or loans from China, and then are thus tethered to it, the world has yet to truly see a power acting in tertiary moves- the strategy of traps and tactics on a deeper strategic level is often lost. Part of the reason China is able to make more complex maneuvers than the United States is due to its autocratic system of governance. The United States requires a president that is clear, commanding, and comprehensive- as well as confident- because these qualities demonstrate a deliberate plan to the public, without disguising secondary maneuvers from the people; it is, after all, a government for the people. China faces no such explanation of maneuvers or plans, as the people are forced to trust in those in power, as they lack a vote regardless. A monarch functions by virtue of streamlined power- leading to great leaders with great ambitions - Napoleons- or weak leaders who are more focused on themselves than their nations. Autocracies and dictatorships function through even more direct ties to power, thus granting further extremes. This is why checks and balances were necessitated. Nations that are too loose and autocratic have no strings to safeguard the people or their values, and so the state seizes property and power- thus halting economic development and investment. Too many strings domestically create too limiting a system that is inflexible and therefore cannot adapt to the changing winds of the world.

Strings, fundamentally, are connections, and can either be positive, negative, or equal- a negative string represents a power dependent upon another state, or that has significant leverage lost to that state; this would be a state like Nicaragua, dependent on Chinese investment and infrastructure.⁵ Contrastingly, positive strings represent the inverse: a power with leverage upon another- in the same scenario, it is China which expresses indirect power upon Nicaragua through this string. As such, strings can be pulled both directly and indirectly to achieve geopolitical goals. Equal strings are best seen in coalitions and trade agreements between equally powerful nations- US-China trade agreements are a perfect example, as it favors no country over the other, and because both are modern great powers, there is no structural imbalance. This would not be the case if, for example, it was a deal between China and the Solomon Islands,⁶ as an “equal” deal could in this case easily be selling China short, or just as well, taking advantage of the smaller economy of the Solomon Islands. There are two kinds of players: those who pull the strings and those who are pulled by them. That is all. That is not to say powers don't do both- but there are alleyways one side or another that are more powerful. For example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait depend upon their water desalination infrastructure from China; it must be maintained, operated, and of course constructed.⁷ But China's tethers in these nations do not compare to the nations' tethers in the world energy economy through oil. Germany, on the other hand, entangled itself deliberately in more red tape in the form of the EU;⁸ it could be a unique power, but compared to Russia, China, and the US, it opted instead for more red tape in exchange for more strings- more tied up, yes, but also more powerful than it otherwise would be. More strings need not mean less efficiency; it is only when they are tied up so much in commissions and committees- in the institutions that ensure peace through entanglement- that executive power is limited. If, like a cunning politician, Germany creates strings to other EU members, then it is able to weaponise the system and gain significantly larger leverage and therefore turn its present weakness of deliberation into brutally powerful efficiency. This is the weaponisation of committees. By another name, politics.

How are Strings Used?

The understanding of power and legitimacy in geopolitics is a crucial one, and as such has been respected for decades if not centuries. This String Theory abides by such principles and acknowledges the credibility behind them; however, it seeks to explain this balance of power and legitimacy under the same umbrella more succinctly. This can be stated more precisely as two principles, refining the working definitions introduced above.

I. Legitimacy is the credibility strings make. Legitimacy is seen primarily through institutions and internal competence; through actions that are deemed moral, acceptable, justified, and internationally legal. However, it is the definitions of moral, acceptable, and justified that are established through the state with the most leverage over others. If a nation controls the International Criminal Court, or the UN, with a disproportionate amount of leverage, and forces other states to abide by its definitions of these terms, then these terms are malleable and dependent upon the power which resides in the center of the web. The one pulling the strings and establishing them. Legitimacy is dependent upon other nations' beliefs; however, by remaining at the center of the institutions, a state can shape those beliefs from the inside, and thus fabricate legitimacy.

II. Power is the strength of a string to pull or hold in line another state. Power is, as established in Part I, the leverage exercised through strings upon a fellow state. If the states hold equal leverage upon one another, then no state wins this tug-of-war and holds power over the other. If it does retain more abundant strings (including individual assets, such as spies, or people within the nation) or more significant strings (entire supply chains or economic sectors), then it holds an advantage and thus power over the other nation.

War serves as a fundamental simplifier and organizer of these strings- nations, following conflict, seek more order through coalitions and treaties- as such, they tidy the international order for better or for worse. The First World War is the perfect example of how strings can lead to enmeshment and escalation. Nations tethered through alliances were bound to protect one another; and as such, unrelated powers warred upon one another with little real incentive aside from a daisy chain ignited with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.⁹ The cost of war was an unstable system of strings; they were overly tethered and unorganized, leading to a pulling on all parts to act, until a less entangled power- the United States- entered the conflict after being pulled in through antagonism by Germany. The League of Nations failed thereafter because it failed on counts of both legitimacy and power¹⁰- it was a statue- representative of an ideal, but effectively frozen. As such, the intended tying of a knot through the League failed, and the Second World War erupted. Appeasement is the perception that the strings of leverage, or the potential of their developing into war, are worth risking the loss of assets and gaining of liabilities to avoid conflict. The Second World War simplified these strings- powers were eliminated, old alliances replaced with cleaner, clearer coalitions and pacts. Treaties established temporary peace, pacts established alliances and joint ventures; however, it was the end of the First World War that allowed the great cutting of strings and simplification of the geopolitical web. Over the centuries leading up to the First World War, Europe was dangerously entangled, with each century adding further entanglement. Briefly, under the Concert of Europe, this system provided peace; however, it required pruning to remain healthy- or at least organized. This did not occur; what replaced it was a daisy chain of strings. The end of the Second World War saw the further organization of strings- without complex and convoluted treaties, the great powers established coalitions and organizations. The USSR, EU, NATO, and later the UN replaced the League of Nations. These organizations acted as representatives of the nations on a smaller scale- the result was not international strings tethering complex alliances and treaties, but instead single plug-ins for major powers to come together; any deliberation then happened within the strings, thus resolving innumerable complex problems of cause and effect. In the earlier system, ties connected nations through a complex maze of history, culture, trade, and military alliances. With a system of simplification, the powers instead simply joined NATO or the EU, wherein they were able to resolve such problems without the same level of entanglement. On the outside, strings from each member nation enter and tie the nations together cleanly. Within the connector, however, there occur the smaller go-ons and negotiations within the organization. This simplification of strings through institutions is crucially unique to the modern new-world order; the old world functioned through messy individual treaties between numerous powers, thus leading to entanglement to a great extent. This also led to more unnecessary conflict, such as seen in WWI, because an action taken to declare or provoke war was not seen with the same ramifications that the same action would be viewed with now. No nation dares wage war within NATO for fear of entangling its allies; in the same way, no nation would dare strike a NATO country. The new world order is one of simplification; in this way, seen largely regionally: NATO, GCC, ASEAN, etc.

Alliances are productive strings which serve as a net of support for great powers but can force weaker powers to become tangled in- the spider rests easy in the web- the gnat does not. A key example of a nation building itself an internal web is China; the dual circulation program initiated in 2020 insulates the Chinese economy from external strings¹¹- slowly pruning its liabilities, while retaining its outgoing strings- managing its assets. What is critical is that not all strings go both ways- China's strings in particular are strictly one-way, whereas a nation like the United States' flows bidirectionally. Where there is a string, there was an opportunity for leverage; a nation that bought from another power could cut off all sales through sanctions, tariffs, or taxes on those goods. Nations could boycott the dominant powers of the economic world in this way, as the notion was that no power held all the resources to sustain itself without trade and the specialization of it. China seeks to insulate itself from such a consequence; however, through this one-way system of strings, much like the US's weaponization of the dollar, if the risk of this is realized before it is perfected, it could send shocks through China's economy. The risk for all power seeking to minimize liabilities is the awareness of those who held the strings that are being cut, and for that power to cut the remainder- thus isolating a nation. The benefits of globalization and interconnectivity are imperative for great powers to succeed in an overarching world order- simply put, a king cannot rule his nation from just the castle. Any power that wishes to be great will inevitably have strings going both ways, and although China seeks to minimize incoming strings and maximize outgoing strings, there will always be some which go both ways, and some which hold great comparative advantages over China. Dual circulation, however, is a clear representation of this string theory being enacted; Modelski's theory of long cycles posits that challengers arise from outside the system,¹² Mackinder's theory of a heartland posits the notion of internal resources and maritime reach,¹³ dual circulation creates a system acknowledging the powerful ties of challengers within a system and compound the impact of Mackinder's reach and land assets with insulated and isolatory nations. No isolated nation can rule the world; but a nation with outgoing strings and few incoming strings can rule with the same advantage of isolation. Dual circulation, therefore, is the physical manifestation of the principle of geopolitical string theory.

The notion that everything is connected is absurd as it is accurate; the people construct webs around orders who construct webs throughout the world. China is a true spider in this regard; eight legs working upon each continent and sea to string up the world- the United States instead acts as a more deliberate puppet master, reluctant to pull strings if it can manage on its own. Independence, then, is crucial for a great power not to have dependencies.

When Washington warned of international entanglement, he meant likely liabilities- as engagement for so young and small a country was merely a risk, whereas for the modern United States it is entirely assets, and therefore less risky. Then there are the nations which are entirely strung out, with no leverage of their own. The Solomon Islands are the quintessential example; all exports feed into China,¹⁴ and so they are dependent upon China- which is not dependent upon them. China provides military aid and support, but in exchange effectively could eliminate the Solomon Islands' sovereignty at their discretion. Like cells that make tissues which make organs and then organisms, the mechanism of emergence provides that states simply like more complex people. This means that the interpersonal mechanisms of strings, best depicted in the courtiers of old, are mirrored on a geopolitical scale. This means, through conflict, friendship, and ambivalence, so are states dictated by human relationships and human nature. In other words, strings scale accordingly. China is a master of these strings- it takes advantage of them in a structural way- infrastructure as alignment, dependency, and most of all chokepoints, particularly at present on critical minerals. India serves as a unique example, wherein it holds few international ties of true significance, but a number of smaller strings; more than anything, however, it is prohibited from being a great power merely by its domestic entanglements, which have become knotted. Should India expand its international ties of leverage strategically, it will thrive. Strategy is minimising the strings you are tied to while maximising those you hold on others. This, however, is very unappealing to one's allies and enemies alike; everyone is playing the same game, and so must compromise; thus we have trade agreements and negotiations of military placement and strategy. This is the heart of geopolitics. The United States utilises its dollar as a key string that the entirety of the world hangs upon;¹⁵ or at least it did until it saw the strategic potential of the dollar- although the world economy has not derailed, it is important to note that obvious heavy-handed measures utilising the dollar as a weapon and strategy do produce increased awareness of the strategic potential of the dollar to turn into a liability rather than an asset. Russia overused its strengths of leverage and was forced to wage war, which has since harmed it further; an ineffective strategy. As the world is more globalised, obvious war becomes distasteful and outdated. The geopolitical landscape has shifted to reflect more the court of a monarchy, wherein clerks and courtiers utilized strategy rather than force to gain and keep power. It is only the monarch, in a kingdom, who is just in utilising force; all others must act indirectly, through forms of manipulation and leverage.

Quantification

Strings must be measured, or else they float about as nebulous concepts, beneficial as theories, but ineffective in terms of application. The measurement of strings, therefore, must be established. Strings are fundamentally connections officially held between two nations- this includes all economic exchanges and policies, military excursions or involvements, soft power (measured through polls, educational exchanges, visas, tourism, etc.), dependence upon another nation (such as through SWIFT, the US dollar, resources such as petrol or rare earth minerals, or microchips), and otherwise geopolitical leveraging. It is this miscellaneous geopolitical leveraging which is difficult to quantify- the pressuring of a president upon a prime minister is individual; it is built upon psychology and sociology, and specific encounters; it can also take place through hostages, spies, backchannels, and human missteps or manipulations. As such, the quantification lies larger in terms of obvious, relevant metrics, such as military bases, trade ratios, and cultural exchanges, as well as shared organizations. Above all, naturally, is the prior establishment of old-world strings, treaties, and pacts; NATO serves as an overarching, clear set of strings between nations, as do the Five Eyes. Quantification, then, requires treating every string as a dyad rather than a national score. China's leverage over the Solomon Islands and the Solomon Islands' leverage over China are two separate calculations, not one; the gap between them is net power, in keeping with the positive, negative, and equal distinction above. Within each dyad, the critical variable is not raw dependence but the cost of exit: a state buying 90% of a good from one partner holds real power only if that partner has no alternative buyer, a point Albert Hirschman established in National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade and one this theory inherits directly.¹⁶ Each category then draws on data that already exists. Economic strings can be measured through UN Comtrade trade shares, UNCTAD FDI stock, and AidData's sovereign lending tracker.¹⁷ Military strings can be measured through basing agreements, SIPRI arms transfer ratios, and formal alliance data from the Correlates of War project.¹⁸ Institutional strings can be measured through IGO membership weighted by voting power and UN General Assembly voting alignment, using Erik Voeten's ideal-point estimates.¹⁹ Soft power can be measured through exchange volumes, tourism flow, and cultural infrastructure. Structural dependency can be measured through SWIFT and reserve currency composition and chokepoint transit exposure. The individual, backchannel category resists a continuous score, but it is not immeasurable; GDELT²⁰ codes diplomatic events by cooperation and conflict intensity in near-real time, and a spike in coercive event coding between two states is evidence that a string is being pulled even when its content stays hidden. Weighting across all categories should not default to a simple average, since a shift in tourism numbers does not carry the same weight as a shift in SWIFT dependency; either principal component analysis or structured expert elicitation should set the weights, and the method chosen should be stated outright. Read together, this quantification does not invent a new field. It synthesizes Hirschman on trade dependence, Keohane and Nye on sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence,²¹ and the Correlates of War tradition of network measurement into a single operational model, one built for simplicity rather than novelty.

Figure I provides an analysis of categorical weights; however, this naturally fluctuates from nation to nation, and particularly over time. For example, the West has a disproportionate impact in soft power, allowing more cultural crossover as a form of influence than its military policy. Soft power can, given perfect circumstances, have a greater impact than economic policy- take, for example, the Soviet Union, which was largely isolated from the economy of the United States, and yet the US soft power infiltrated the nation to great effect.²² This is more significant for individual strings- perhaps an American diplomat, or simply an American friend, has the ear of the British Prime Minister; perhaps an MI6 Officer has an informant on the policies of Lebanon before they are enacted and can take preventative actions before the policies take place, as opposed to after. The conditional nature of the world makes theories inapplicable with base values; not all influence is proportional- an armored brigade entering Ukraine from Poland does not hold the same impact as an armored brigade entering Russia from China. Figure I, therefore, serves more as a reference to be shifted and applied according to the facts of the situation, given that enough evidence is supplied. Further information on Figure I and its application can be found in the appendix.

Figure I

Formula: Effective Score = Weight × (Raw Dependence Score ÷ 100) × Substitutability Multiplier

As institutions organize and simplify strings; strings organize and simplify geopolitical relationships.

Economic Strings

Money is a form of leverage; it serves as an extension of power. As such, it is one of the most prominent examples of strings in the modern age. As the world became more peaceful and economies more intertwined through globalization, economic leverage also became a more viable form of manipulation. The hegemon of such strings is undisputedly the United States, largely as a result of the petrodollar and its place in the economy as a foundation- exchanges that have nothing to do with the United States utilize the US dollar as their medium of exchange. This allows the United States to hold leverage upon nearly all nations with incredible power- through legitimacy. If not for the legitimacy of the US dollar, it would not be as successful and ubiquitous as it is; the most prominent example of this logic is reflected in China’s renminbi, which sees little international circulation outside of specific Chinese international banks. These international banks hold leverage largely over nations in the global south, and attempt to take the place of the IMF and World Bank; however, they are often limited to smaller, short-term investment projects. These banks and investments serve as leverage over the nations in which they reside- the projects require maintenance, and such maintenance requires Chinese experts in the infrastructure, leading to an innate dependency. The economic strings have been plucked by the United States predominantly in specific nations- FDPRs to counter China’s push for microchips and Huawei’s influence,²³ sanctions on Iran and Russia, as well as the blocking of technologies such as SWIFT in China and Russia alike. It is here that nations have been made aware of strings and attempt to resolve this through the fabrication of new, insulated wires. These wires serve as Russian and Chinese alternatives to SWIFT; however, they lack such proliferation that they only insulate the nations within themselves, and not in smaller blocs attempting to seek freedom from leverage. Here, a fundamental idea plays out- nations that attempt to cut strings with one power- such as the United States- are forced to follow the leader of another bloc- such as China. Therefore, there will always be unique leaders of strings, known as hegemons and challengers in Modelski’s Table, but also as great powers to Paul Kennedy,²⁴ and otherwise bloc leaders and superpowers. There is a reason embedded within the DNA of humanity and geopolitics, as an extension, that leads to certain leaders able to hold the most strings, and for tribalism to create factions. Strings serve to explain both the large and small influences of and on states in such a way, as they can be deployed to understand nations and individuals alike, and can be fit to any scale. Economically, however, the relationship is more than that of the tenant and landlord, but instead of states which can pull and push on one another, although the United States holds dominance through the ubiquity of the dollar; the investment projects of China serve as a more direct form of a string. The dollar does not force all who utilize it to bow to the will of the United States or face consequences; by contrast, the infrastructure and dependence upon Chinese banks often leads to direct leverage which is deliberately applied. Trade serves as the natural extension of economic strings, much more commonly than borrowers and lenders, as globalization has led to constant trade throughout nearly all nations with most other nations. The nations with the most competitive advantages benefit in such a network of strings, but the netting is so complex that there is no clear, evident “winner” of globalization, only a vast number of nations that greatly benefit. Nations which hold disproportionate trade relationships with other states- such as China and the Solomon Islands- hold great leverage. If a nation obtains nearly all of its technology from a single nation- such as microchips from Taiwan- then that nation holds the strings of the entire sector for that nation. In the case of Taiwan, it holds nearly all the strings on microchips, sharing lightly with nations like Japan and the United States, while China seeks to match it.²⁵ Such economic strings were utilized in the first US-Iranian negotiations, leading to the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal.²⁶ No weapons need firing, simply purse strings drawn shut.

Military Strings

Military strings are traditionally the most visible of any. Coalitions and pacts, treaties and alliances of military significance are primarily public, whereas occupations or military bases are by nature physical, visible landmarks. The nature of specific military facilities is more obscure, such as the US nuclear military base in Greenland; however, the facilities themselves are evidently militant and therefore visible strings. There are more discrete war-based strings, such as facilities for biological warfare, as such plants can be conducted in as small a space as an apartment kitchen, as opposed to the massive scale required for nuclear production; chemical weaponry falls between such scales. Terrorists and guerrilla insurgents can blend in with both natural environments and civil populations, thus creating further invisibility for the extent of military strings. Overall, however, military strings serve as the most predominantly obvious strings- and by no accident. States benefit from their pacts, such as NATO, being known to the world. Fleets of aircraft carriers are difficult to obscure; submarines by nature are hidden, and it is in such dichotomies that leverage and strings are made apparent. Strings work best through their visibility to both powers; an alliance between China and Russia requires both parties to be aware of the stationing of Chinese fleets in the Arctic- even if they are obscured to the world. However, a Chinese presence around Taiwan must be visible to apply pressure to Taiwan- if the Taiwanese lack awareness of submarines parked around its borders, life will continue as before. It is only when China attempts to force a deal with Taiwan, making known the imminent threat, that the strings gain power. That is not to discredit invisible forces; however, these are most valuable when utilized and cannot be mapped while invisible. For analysis, however, they are harmful. From a purely strategic point, they allow for certain leverage to be taken- higher risks with the nation, in the scenario of war, for example, because the actualization of war has already been prepared for. This was the role of the US Jupiter missiles²⁷ in Turkey; whereas the missiles in Cuba were denied by the USSR for the inverse reason, leverage can be applied both invisibly and visibly. In the end, however, the US was aware of the missiles- military strings- in Cuba, and their leverage, ever-present, helped negotiate a deal.²⁸ This is the most applicable usage of invisible to visible military leverage: a power appears weak until it is beneficial to appear strong, which it can become at a moment’s notice. In the modern age, most military ties are seen in US military bases, the movements of naval fleets, and the sending of arms to allies, or the selling of arms to neutral parties. As the world shifted towards pacifism, military strings have lost no ground in leverage; however, economic strings have gained more direct impact- it is less frequent that missiles or bullets have direct impact on geopolitics, as much as economic means. It is for this reason that the US chose legitimacy when dealing with the Russo-Ukraine conflict, through sanctions and economic strings, as well as sending arms, as opposed to engagement. The role of the US strikes in Iran, by contrast, was actions of direct power, rather than legitimacy, but were completed with military strings accompanied by- in fact, preceded by- economic strings.

Soft Strings

Soft strings are colloquially cultural strings. They stem from the same logic of soft power, and serve as cultural ties connecting major sources of culture with smaller powers. The imperative notion of soft strings is that regardless of a nation’s legitimacy or power, economic or military ties, as well as coalitions, soft strings serve the equal purpose. The power of nations to export their culture is crucial to their success, and is reflected best, if nowhere else, in cultural, language, and educational exchange programs. Soft strings, unsparingly, are best seen in some of the most prominent soft power examples; namely the influence of American radio into the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. The lack of military or economic leverage presents the situation as one entirely predicated upon the power of soft strings. The Voice of America in the 1940s expanded into Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; a thread of soft strings, stitched across Europe and into a society that was otherwise impossible to access. No trade nor brigade could penetrate the iron curtain- but voices, the influence of soft strings; that could.²⁹ Estimates suggest Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty alone reached tens of millions of listeners across the Soviet sphere at the height of the Cold War, a substantial share of them inside the USSR itself.³⁰ The Kremlin’s response is itself evidence of the string’s strength: Soviet authorities devoted enormous resources to jamming the broadcasts and prosecuting listeners, yet the audience persisted.³¹ Such a theory follows the same pattern more generally- a soft string need not travel in tandem with an economic or military string to pull with just as much power. Boris Yeltsin later credited Radio Liberty as a vital information channel during the attempted 1991 coup which hastened the Soviet collapse, a claim made famous for its frequent citation by Cold War scholars of the evidence of broadcasting power; and how soft strings, in the end, outlasted the harder ones.³² The contemporary parallels of such strings are ever-present given the utility and amplification provided by the internet. Korean and Japanese cultural exports flourish in the Western world, as does French cultural diplomacy in Francophone Africa, which operates on the same logic and extends influence into societies otherwise isolated from economic and military strings.

Regional Strings

Regional strings are simply the application of all other strings- economic, soft, and military- in regional blocs. The USSR served as a bloc of economically and militarily entwined nations, although of differing degrees of cultural integration. The EU is the most modern example of such regional blocs, with shared, albeit different, cultures, an integrated military and economic system, all of which amounts to such entanglement that the nations hold significantly less individual power in the world than in their respective coalitions, or as collective regions. The European Union serves as an obvious case study of regional strings which have become so entwined that they bind economic, military, and soft strings into a singular knot. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty which established the EU bound member states into three primary sects; the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation on justice and domestic affairs, as well as a roadmap toward Economic and monetary union.³³ It was, of course, the economic string which was most binding of these, as a criteria of capping budget deficits and public debt served as a condition of entry into a shared currency, a surrender of domestic fiscal autonomy which had never before been extracted from sovereign European states, established. ³⁴ The exchange was pooled sovereignty for pooled leverage- individually, France, Germany, and Italy carry a fraction of the weight in global trade negotiations, currency markets, or regulatory standard-setting that they carry collectively as the EU, whose single market and euro give it bargaining power against the United States and China that no member state could achieve alone.³⁵ Yet the compounding is visible in what individual members sacrificed to achieve it. Denmark and the United Kingdom negotiated formal opt-outs from the monetary pillar specifically because full entanglement risked more sovereignty loss than their electorates would accept, and the Danish public’s initial rejection of the treaty in a 1992 referendum reflected exactly the anxiety the theory predicts- that regional strings, once pulled taut, are difficult to loosen again.³⁶ The EU case demonstrates that regional strings are not merely economic, soft, and military strings applied at a larger scale; but rather serve as a distinct category because other member states surrender their ability to sever any one string without unravelling the careful cloth of the others, a form of entanglement a bilateral relationship, however close, rarely produces.

Individual Strings

Individual strings are the most fickle and volatile of all, and are capable of holding major influence in geopolitics. The metaphor of the consul with the king’s ear is not outdated, simply framed for an older era- a diplomat with close ties to the leader of a nation is able to provide direct influence on policy, a dynamic Kissinger himself both theorized and practiced across four decades of American diplomacy.³⁷ In such a way, the desires of the individuals, be they generals, diplomats, trade advisors, translators, or prime ministers, change the course of history greatly. One well-placed spy is able to provide unique advantages to the spy’s home country and shift the geopolitical landscape in its favor. As such, the strings between powerful individuals, such as a prime minister and president of two nations, can be struck to cause direct change in international relations, without going through the process of domestic voting. Individual strings have served nations and other individuals alike, as such was the role of Henry Kissinger’s secret July 1971 trip to Beijing. A backchannel conducted through the government of Pakistan; for nearly a year Washington had exchanged signals indirectly through Romanian and Pakistani intermediaries, which created a dynamic wherein neither power could trust any conventional diplomatic channel, without a rapprochement neither side wished to risk announcing prematurely. ³⁸ Pakistani President Yahya Khan personally arranged the mechanics of the trip, feigning a diplomatic illness for Kissinger that allowed his motorcade to be swapped for a decoy while the National Security Advisor was flown from Islamabad to Beijing aboard a Pakistani government aircraft.³⁹ Only a handful of officials on either side knew the trip was occurring; even the U.S. State Department was kept in ignorance of the plan.⁴⁰ Over forty-eight hours of talks with Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger secured what Nixon needed most- an invitation for a presidential visit- without a single formal diplomatic exchange between the two governments preceding it.⁴¹ Such an episode reflects the theory of individual strings, as it directly bypassed every other category available to the two states; the economic relationship was absent, the military alliance non-existent, and no regional bloc was able to mediate the distant nations. What existed instead as a personal relationship between Kissinger, Nixon, and Yahya Khan which served as trusted enough to move history a year prior to any public institutions. Pakistan’s role as a trusted backchannel has recurred in the decades since, particularly in messages between Washington and Tehran, thus underscoring that individual trust as well as institutional trust, once established, can function as a durable string in its own right, reusable well beyond the episode that created it.⁴²

Modern Colonialism

The world, following the Second World War, came to an understanding that the great powers of past and present, most imperatively those that remained in the aftermath of the war, must forgo power for legitimacy. This exchange was taken only to an extent; of course, it did not lead to the disbanding of entire militaries of the winning nations, but it did defer power to institutions and organizations; namely, the UN and NATO. These powers gave up independent power and leverage on the world and on one another, in exchange for a more legitimate unity. What changed as a result was the relinquishing of colonies not only in practice but also as a practice. Colonies that were still under rule were largely made independent- an action taken even by the United States, in the pseudo-colony of the Philippines.⁴³ This act of granting freedom to a colony- something by definition entangled in and feeding incoming strings to a higher power- reflected a greater legitimacy of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. It was the first indicator to the world that the era of American Hegemony would not be one of pure power, but instead of largely legitimate actions. This legitimacy would fluctuate as the United States became entrenched in war after war, but largely the great powers of the world, particularly in Europe, with the exception of the Soviet Union, held to a standard of legitimacy in place of power. This is the same notion seen in Part I, Chapter 1, as European powers exchanged individual power for a larger group responsibility, and higher levels of legitimacy, through organizations such as the EU. The modern world, therefore, ceased to have colonies. It did, at least, for a time. To better understand how colonies have returned to the modern world, one must first explore what colonies fundamentally are, in terms of String Theory. A colony in terms of mere incoming and outgoing strings is a puppet state; that is, the strings are pulled upon it from an external power, which extracts all it can from the colony, and gives as little as possible in return. It is a purely extractive investment in nature; the construction of a colony is designed to maximize output and minimize input; more strings feeding the motherland, effectively no strings feeding the colony. However, colonies existed in a time of more bidirectional strings; that is, should a colony hold a major strike, the economy of the metropole suffers, because it, to an extent, depends upon the colony.

This is where the modern colony differs. Firstly, modern colonies are not dubbed colonies- they are not viewed externally or internally as repressed, or as if they are serving a more powerful nation. All nations in the modern age appear sovereign, regardless of the extent of how true this may be. There are no present empires; although there is colloquially the American Empire, it is simply a reiteration of the notion of the American Hegemony- an empire possesses colonies; the United States does not. What the United States does possess, however, is strings and leverage; this is particularly through economic and military establishments, such as the wide disbursement of US bases,⁴⁴ the ubiquity of the US dollar,⁴⁵ and the presence of US fleets. As such, although the US pulls strings, it also has strings pulled upon it from other nations; this is what differentiates allies from vassal states: the tension is largely mutual, there is constant give and take; there is balance, not enslavement.

Case Study – The Solomon Islands China, however, possesses tributary states through one-sided relationships. This is reflected in the case of the Solomon Islands. The primary economic focus of the Solomon Islands is the selling of lumber, 90% of which is bought by China.⁴⁶ China does not need the lumber from the Solomon Islands desperately; it has various other means of acquiring lumber, sourcing softwood from New Zealand and Russia, and hardwoods from Vietnam, the United States, and Thailand. The Solomon Islands are nowhere close to being a major importer into the Chinese resource economy, and yet their economy almost exclusively hinges on their relationship with China. Public unrest, resulting from this one-sided relationship, erupted within the Solomon Islands, which was unable to properly support its police force. China stepped in with a sale of police equipment, which later expanded into the 2022 security deal, wherein China held the power to provide a police force in the Solomon Islands to provide security.⁴⁷ The exchange for this national quartering of Chinese nationals was the cost of the surrounding waters; the Solomon Islands agreed to permit Chinese naval activity and stationing in their sovereign waters. Simplifying this relationship is the strings of the sovereign connections; although not all strings can be mapped between two nations, the overarching patterns provide a suitable framework for an analysis of the relationship. The Solomon Islands depend entirely upon China- they have no alternative, as their waters are patrolled and laws enforced by China. It is, fundamentally, a tributary state, one which pays tribute to China in lumber, but is otherwise helpless. It is not, by any international definition, a China-owned state; it is not a colony- other nations may conduct trade, and the Solomon Islands may choose to voice itself internationally against China. However, such decisions would be politically suicidal. Take, for example, the relationships of China and its Latin American investments.⁴⁸⁴⁹ The corresponding pattern of nations with infrastructure dependent upon Chinese maintenance and voting in favor of Chinese policies internationally is a clear indicator not simply of a positive working relationship, nor of alignment, but of pseudo-colonization. The strings are pulled by the nation which controls them, and forces the policy of the vassal state to follow suit at its own peril. Chokepoints play a crucial rule in modern string game theory- China’s 2017 opening of its first overseas military base, in Djibouti, astride the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, is illustrative of exactly this kind of chokepoint positioning⁵⁰- as a chokepoint anywhere in the world is able to be altered and change the entire tapestry as a whole; an empire which owns chokepoints owns the world, but an empire which owns a nation in and of itself is an older form of power. Empires were, for most of history, powerful nations which exercised their will upon those around them, beginning regionally- such as Persia in the Middle East or Rome in the Mediterranean- expanding to conquer larger domains, often via seafaring and naval capability, as well as trade surpluses. Empires or great powers both utilize colonies to achieve further expansion and fuel the internal economy of the world power. China's policy of dual circulation insulates the nation from the dependency of the domestic economy on international ties, while retaining major international leverage through strings of infrastructure, trade, and, in fewer cases, military means. The United States, by contrast, has incredibly prevalent international military strings, as well as trade and leading institutions, but gained power through military and economic means. The result is a nation of colonial strings- China- which are largely built on legitimacy, even if not through traditional institutions, and a nation of institutional strings- the United States- which are built on less legitimate ties as they are military, as well as an absence of colonies. In this ironic dichotomy, the United States retains no colonies- which the world system, following WWII, established as illegitimate- and loses legitimacy through the methods by which it holds strings of power, while China gains further legitimacy in the same motion it gains power through, despite possessing modern colonies.

The question, therefore, of empire as opposed to hegemony is imperative to answer. China, as opposed to the United States, is an empire; the United States, rather, is a hegemon. A hegemon must balance power and legitimacy, as well as abiding by the institutions it heads- should the United States ignore the behest of the UN or NATO, for example, it erodes the legitimacy it helped establish. In such a scenario, the smaller powers within these simplifying coalitions can utilize their collective strength to oust the United States from a place of authority over them. China, not dependent upon such institutions, plays by the rules of the old-world game, one of colonies and international one-on-one treaties; no simplification of regional alliances needed. China is a nation which attempts to stand in both the old world and new world- it utilizes modern institutions such as the WTO to bolster its own ambitions; it uses ASEAN for leverage over other nations, but adds strings outside the coalitions as well. In this way, it attempts to game the modern system by playing with the rules of the old system. The risk this runs, of course, is that of legitimacy. Chinese heavy-handedness in certain regions or policies leads to heavy skepticism of foreign powers. What is most likely, then, is that China believes that through usage of the new-world system, by using old-world strategies, it can gain enough power to need not legitimacy. It will harness legitimacy as long as it remains a smaller power, but with enough power amassed, it will relinquish legitimacy in exchange for power. This path is already underway in China's removal of 12,000 courses of study⁵¹- particularly in humanitarian subjects, foreign languages, and cultural studies. By removing the foundation for legitimacy internationally at the root- the education system- it can focus its manpower on the power of international relations instead: economics and war. This explains the Chinese push for hard-science educated students, which is reflected in the alteration of the gaokao to focus primarily on hard sciences,⁵² thus making the only viable path into higher education and thus a better life through such subjects. Rush Doshi's exploration of Chinese phases of geopolitical power further expands upon the notion that China will amass legitimacy while quietly gaining power,⁵³ to eventually trade one for the other, and thus gaming the old system. In summary, Chinese usage of strings creates colonies which feed the empire's ambitions for power, through legitimate means, by not dubbing any nations truly “colonies”. However, it is China's ambition to become so powerful that it need not legitimacy- that it instead will be the determinant of legitimacy through its overwhelming power. This exchange of legitimacy for power is already underway. Thus marks a direct split in the paths the United States and China took to become empires- the United States relinquished its colonies, such as the Philippines, to bring legitimacy to the world, exchanging power for legitimacy, while China took the inverse approach. This was able to occur through the Chinese understanding of international strings, and as such the ability to make modern colonies, all the while retaining legitimacy; strings provide, therefore, the best explanation for Chinese dual circulation strategy, as well as an understanding of how modern colonies work, and how China exploits the modern system of legitimacy to gain power.

Conclusion- A Brief Look at the World Wide Web

To conclude, a synopsis of the most prominent, powerful, and evident strings has been compiled for a general overview of the world’s tethering. This, however, only goes one degree deep- it is thereby the most surface-level analysis possible, and meant largely for general reference and evidence of patterns, rather than for deep comprehension. The world is fundamentally tangled up in ties between the United States and China; however, the United States is more embedded in this web, while China sits upon it without getting stuck within it. However, with any great or world power, there must come a time of embeddedness, to some extent or another; as such, it is likely that China, as it gains international legitimacy and power, will become more and more entangled as it attempts to engage with larger powers. As an incoming and rising power, China falls under the unique category of a power able to take advantage of past establishments- China can defeat the traditional, expensive tanks, for example, with cheap explosive drones.⁵⁴ The same is true for the world of geopolitics- should China establish a system of 5G, as it attempted and succeeded with varying degrees across Europe,⁵⁵ it can thereby use that platform as a tool for manipulation. It is these subtler, cheaper strategies that China will attempt to use to avoid the trap of entanglement- that does not mean China will succeed. It is very likely that, after tying enough strings, China finds itself not just in the center of a web, but also trapped by it, with less maneuverability, due to strategies that, at the time of the nation’s rise, seemed beneficial. Strings by nature are not slippery, at least not major strings. The strings between individuals hold more loosely, and in some cases more tightly, than others, but economic, military, and political strings tend towards the same category of stiffness. As such, the China–Solomon Islands case above should be taken as what it is- a single worked illustration of the framework, not an exhaustive mapping of the world's ties. Nonetheless, should future scholars map the entire world, however exhaustive a task that may be, or compare the ties between nations over the span of ten or fifty years, changes are sure to arise and reflect geopolitical patterns. Strings, after all, are nothing new- they are a tool derived from past theories to serve as a looking glass into the past to help predict the future. They may serve as a Gordian Knot, but through careful pruning and analysis, can be utilized to map geopolitical changes.

Appendices

Appendix A — Category Weights

Formula: Effective Score = Weight × (Raw Dependence Score ÷ 100) × Substitutability Multiplier

Appendix B — Scoring Rubric: Raw Dependence Score Anchors

Appendix C — Worked Example: China → Solomon Islands

Appendix D — Net Leverage Interpretation Scale

Notes & References

Notes