Türkiye’s Middle Ground

Hedging serves as a form of risk-management for states in which the state avoid taking a firm side in rivalries or ongoing conflicts between major powers. Instead of publicizing a stance, the state practices a mixed approach to maintain flexibility, neutrality and to maximize their own gains. With its recent acts, Turkiye can be classified as a country that falls within this framework. The S-400 situation between Ankara, Washington, and Moscow solidifies this classification. Ankara made an unexpected choice by purchasing Russia’s S-400 air-defence system which led to several developments within the air-defence system with concurrent implications on the political system.

During the deliberation process, Ankara considered the U.S Patriot and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T. It must be noted that nearly a month after the attempted coup of July 2016, Erdogan announced a new strategic partnership with Russia and interest in the S-400 technology. In 2017, Turkish officials commented on the S-400 arrangement and stated that transfer of technology was one of the most important aspects of this partnership. The U.S offer was unable to satisfy Turkiye’s industrial demands. On December 18, 2018, the Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible $3.5 billion sale to Turkiye for the Patriot air-defence equipment and relevant support. However, the notification stated Turkiye had made requests for industrial offsets but an agreement was yet to be concluded. The exact and precise benefits were not noted in the DSCA and were left to the individual contractors and Turkiye. Finally, as a result of the deliberation process, Turkiye signed a contract with Russia in September 2017. The reported value of this deal stands at $2.5 billion and under this deal, Russia agreed to deliver four S-400 batteries, technical cooperation and joint development. The exact scope of these commitments is not known within public records. However, it seems that the 2017 deal offered Ankara a higher standard of industrial cooperation. In reality, this standard seemed to be partly aspirational. It was reported that the first Russian shipments did actually not include technology transfer and negotiations were underway regarding the next few shipments.

From the general tracking of the deal and its timeline, it can be said that Turkiye selected the more illustrious Russian offer after Western negotiations failed to satisfy the publicly stated terms. Overall, the purchase of the S-400 equipment can be understood as a combination of operational need and industrial ambitions. However, it cannot clearly be established that Turkiye made this purchase solely to undermine its Western allies or to cross NATO. Current scholarship and records seem to be contested over this line of inquiry.

Regardless of the details of Ankara’s specific decision-making process, the repercussions that followed were evident. Washington treated the S-400 as incompatible with Turkiye’s role in the F-35 program. Previously, Turkiye served as one of the eight original partners in the F-35 consortium. It had both a consumer role and an industrial partner role as it produced components for the global F-35 supply chain. On July 12 2019, Turkiye received the first few elements of the S-400. As a result, the Department of Defence began removing Ankara from the Joint Strike Fighter Program in the same month. U.S officials argued that Turkish operation of the S-400 alongside the F-35 could potentially allow Moscow to gather information about the F-35 programs. Using this as a basis for their reasoning, Turkiye began to be ‘unwinded’ from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. This was no small loss to Turkiye. Turkiye had planned to acquire 100 F-35A aircraft. The Pentagon estimated that Turkey would lose more than $9 billion in projected work over the life of the program.

These facts serve to prove that Turkiye chose to defy Washington in a symbolic manner. It chose to accept the major industrial loss which spanned over training access, Western defence network participation, jobs, and future economic opportunities. This willing acceptance of ‘defeat’ and a stark ‘defiance’ point towards how much Ankara valued its strategic autonomy. Recently, President Trump expressed openness to an F-35 sale if Washington and Ankara could come to terms on a way which would render the S-400 inoperable. However, as per the legal language, Turkiye is required to ‘no longer possess the system’. This means that disabling the system or storing would not be sufficient to satisfy American law.

After Turkiye’s removal from the F-35 program, the United States officially imposed CAATSA sanctions on Turkiye on December 14, 2020. These sanctions were imposed under Section 231 of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) upon the Republic of Turkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport. These sanctions were targeted upon specific areas rather than falling under a general economic embargo. This prohibited the issuance of U.S. export licenses and authorization to SSB. It also prohibited U.S financial institutions from providing SSB with loans or credits above $10 million in any 12-month period. They barred Export-Import Bank assistance for exports to SSB and required the United States to oppose loans benefiting SSB through international financial institutions. Additionally, visa restrictions were placed on Dr. Ismail Demir who served as SSB’s president and other relevant SSB officers. The specific design of these restrictions allowed Washington to punish the defence-procurement channel but left room for potential positive U.S and Turkish relations.

It must be noted that Turkiye was seemingly treated differently from a country ~4200 kilometres away: India. New Delhi’s case demonstrates the importance of Ankara’s alliance status. In October 2018, India concluded a contract with President Putin for five S-400 systems. It can be said that India completed this deal knowing full well that it could potentially face U.S sanctions. However, the U.S did immediately impose such sanctions. In 2022, the Congressional Research Service reported that the Biden administration had not yet made a formal determination regarding the matter. Washington’s divergence in dealing with these two scenarios can be boiled down to Turkiye’s allied-status and participation in the F-35 program. As India currently holds a non-allied status, this gave Washington more flexibility in dealing with the matter.

The record after the S-400 deal between Russia and Turkiye offers adequate evidence as proof of Turkiye’s hedging behaviour. However, it is not enough to prove an actual transfer of Turkiye towards China or Russia. Since then, Turkiye also maintained important ties with the West. Overall, Ankara accepted substantial costs to purchase Russia’s S-400 air-defence system, yet it did not abandon NATO or sever Western defence ties. Hence, the S-400 episode supports the hedging hypothesis. It shows a state using a Russian procurement decision to assert autonomy inside a Western alliance. However, it does not prove Turkish drift away from the established Western bloc.

Notes & References

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